Fultz v. Dunn by unknown
1998 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
12-21-1998 
Fultz v. Dunn 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998 
Recommended Citation 
"Fultz v. Dunn" (1998). 1998 Decisions. 281. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998/281 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1998 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed December 21, 1998 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
Nos. 97-7378 and 97-7503 
 
KENNETH W. FULTZ 
 
v. 
 
JOHN S. DUNN, JR.; DENNIS L. FARLEY; 
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES, 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; JAMES M. SEIF 
 
       John S. Dunn, Jr.; 
       Dennis L. Farley, 
 
       Appellants in No. 97-7378 
 
KENNETH W. FULTZ 
 
       Appellant in No. 97-7503 
 
v. 
 
JOHN S. DUNN, JR.; DENNIS FARLEY; 
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES, 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; JAMES M. SEIF 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 94-01914) 
 
Argued November 19, 1998 
 
BEFORE: GREENBERG, ALITO, and 
GODBOLD,* Circuit Judges 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
*Honorable John C. Godbold, Senior Judge of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation. 
 
 
  
(Filed: December 21, 1998) 
 
       D. Michael Fisher 
       Attorney General 
       John G. Knorr, III (argued) 
       Chief Deputy Attorney General 
       Chief, Appellate Litigation 
       Section 
       Calvin R. Koons 
       Senior Deputy Attorney General 
       Gwendolyn T. Mosley 
       Senior Deputy Attorney General 
       15th Floor, Strawberry Square 
       Harrisburg, PA 17120 
 
        Attorneys for John S. Dunn and 
        Dennis L. Farley 
 
       Cletus P. Lyman (argued) 
       Michael S. Fettner 
       Lyman & Ash 
       1612 Latimer Street 
       Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
        Attorneys for Kenneth W. Fultz 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Appellants John S. Dunn, Jr. and Dennis Farley, officers 
of the Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and 
Natural Resources, appeal from a final judgment entered on 
a jury verdict against them in favor of appellee Kenneth W. 
Fultz, a Department employee. Fultz asserted a First 
Amendment retaliation claim in this action under 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983, the alleged retaliation being in response to his 
conduct in having brought an action entitled Fultz v. Davis, 
D.C. Civ. No. 90-00779 ("Davis"), in the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. In 
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Davis, Fultz successfully challenged his dismissal in 1988 
by the Department of Environmental Resources, the 
predecessor to the Department of Conservation and Natural 
Resources. As a matter of convenience, we refer to both 
Departments interchangeably as Department. In particular, 
in this case Fultz charged that upon his reemployment, as 
a result of Davis Dunn, the Department's Chief of Employee 
Relations and Training, deprived him of his seniority, thus 
causing him to lose a later promotion to a position as Park 
Operations Manager I. Fultz asserted that Dunn took this 
action on behalf of himself and Farley, the Director of the 
Department's Bureau of Personnel, and thus we do not 
differentiate between the appellants in this opinion. The 
appellants denied that Dunn acted to retaliate against 
Fultz, and at and after the trial unsuccessfully sought a 
judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
50(b). 
 
On this appeal the appellants assert that they are 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, or, alternatively, 
to a new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. Inasmuch as 
Dunn reemployed Fultz in accordance with a civil service 
rule which afforded him no discretion to make a decision 
that would have preserved Fultz's seniority, we hold that, 
as a matter of law, Dunn, and thus Farley, did not retaliate 
against Fultz. Consequently, we will reverse the judgment 
of the district court as well as all orders and judgments 
granting Fultz monetary damages or equitable relief and 
will remand the case to the district court to vacate all such 
orders and judgments. Moreover, the district court on the 
remand should enter a judgment as a matter of law in favor 
of Dunn and Farley. Our disposition of the appeal makes it 
unnecessary for us to consider the appellants' request for a 
new trial. 
 
Fultz appeals from orders which stayed execution on the 
judgment without requiring the appellants to post a 
supersedeas bond, and which deferred an award of 
attorney's fees pending disposition of the appellants' 
appeal. We have consolidated the two appeals. In view of 
our disposition of the appellants' appeal, we will dismiss 
Fultz's appeal, which clearly is moot as he no longer has a 
judgment in his favor and cannot recover attorney's fees 
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under 42 U.S.C. S 1988, as he is not a prevailing party. See 
U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 
U.S. 18, 21, 115 S.Ct. 386, 389 (1994). 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Factual History 
 
In 1988, the Department fired Fultz from his position as 
a state park manager after 24 years of employment, in part 
for running a boat storage business without the 
Department's knowledge. In various fora, Fultz argued that 
the Department fired him without procedural due process 
and, in 1990, he filed the Davis action in the district court 
against the Department and two of its officials, other than 
Dunn or Farley, challenging his termination. In Davis, the 
district court granted the defendants summary judgment, 
but on appeal on July 15, 1991, we reversed, as we held 
that Fultz had not received the pre-termination hearing 
required by Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 
532, 105 S.Ct. 1487 (1985). Thus, we ordered the 
defendants to reinstate Fultz to his position. We further 
provided that the district court could consider additional 
relief on remand. Significantly, however, we permitted the 
Department to refile charges against Fultz on the basis of 
a constitutionally adequate hearing. See Fultz v. Davis, Nos. 
90-6039 and 91-5058, slip op. at 14 (3d Cir. July 15, 
1991). Thus, our opinion was a procedural victory for Fultz 
but in no way exonerated him from the Department's 
misconduct allegations against him. 
 
On May 29, 1992, Fultz and the Department reached a 
settlement agreement before trial on the remand in Davis. 
The agreement stated that Fultz acknowledged his error in 
engaging in the boat storage business and that he regretted 
his activity. On the other hand, the Department agreed not 
to re-file charges against him and, as particularly germane 
here, the Department agreed to "re-employ Fultz in the 
capacity of Park Superintendent IV with re-employment to 
commence June 15, 1992," "to provide [Fultz] with 40 days 
annual leave and 135 days of sick leave," and to pay 
$75,000 to Fultz "in settlement of his claims." The 
agreement further provided that the defendants would 
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"purge [Fultz's personnel] file with respect to matters 
investigated or charged in 1988." Significantly, the 
agreement did not mention seniority. 
 
Dunn, who was not a party in Davis, was responsible for 
implementing the settlement agreement. The Department 
reemployed Fultz in the Bureau of State Parks in 
Harrisburg at an appropriate rank and pay level. To comply 
with the settlement agreement provision requiring the 
purging of Fultz's personnel file, Dunn deleted the word 
"terminated" from Fultz's computer personnel record and 
substituted the benign term "voluntary resignation" to 
describe the break in Fultz's work history from 1988-1992. 
It is undisputed that upon his reemployment the 
Department did not credit him with seniority for his 
employment prior to his 1988 termination, or for 1988- 
1992. In effect, the Department treated Fultz as a newly 
hired employee with seniority accruing from the date it 
rehired him in 1992. 
 
In November 1992, Fultz applied for a promotion to either 
of two Department positions at higher levels in rank and 
with higher salaries than his position at that time. When 
the Department awarded the positions to other applicants, 
Fultz learned that he had not recaptured his seniority upon 
his reemployment, and had been viewed as an employee 
with five months rather than 24 years of seniority. Fultz 
attributes his failure to obtain a position as Park Manager 
I to his loss of seniority for his service prior to his 1988 
termination. 
 
B. Procedural History 
 
On November 22, 1994, Fultz filed this suit against the 
appellants, advancing two arguments: (1) Dunn had 
miscalculated his seniority to retaliate against him for 
having successfully brought the 1990 Davis action, and (2) 
he otherwise would have received one of the promotions. 
We focus on the first argument because our disposition of 
it is determinative of this appeal. The court submitted the 
case to the jury on written interrogatories. Thefirst 
question was "Do you find that [Fultz's] exercise of the First 
Amendment rights was a substantial or motivating factor in 
Defendant Dunn's calculation of his seniority?" The court 
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told the jury that if it answered that question "No" it was to 
return to the courtroom, thus recognizing that unless Fultz 
was successful on that question he would lose the case. On 
this appeal, Fultz does not contend that the court was 
wrong on this point. 
 
The jury, however, answered "Yes" and went on to answer 
the remaining interrogatories in Fultz's favor and to award 
him substantial damages. In addition, the court granted 
Fultz equitable relief which, in view of our disposition, we 
need not describe at length. On January 16, 1997, the 
district court denied the appellants' motions for a judgment 
as a matter of law or for a new trial, finding the motions 
untimely filed, but stating that there was sufficient evidence 
in the record to support the jury's verdict. In a subsequent 
opinion, however, the court acknowledged that the post- 
trial motion leading to the January 16, 1997 order was 
timely and Fultz does not contend that the appellants have 
not preserved the right to contend on this appeal that they 
were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
Our standard of review on this appeal is well established. 
We exercise plenary review and will overturn a jury verdict 
"only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the nonmovant and giving it the advantage of every fair and 
reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence from 
which a jury reasonably could find liability." Lightning Lube, 
Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
Because Fultz alleges that his conduct in having brought 
the Davis case led the appellants to retaliate against him by 
wrongly calculating his seniority, the case is governed by 
the three-prong analysis enunciated by the Supreme Court 
in Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 
U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568 (1977). A public employee alleging 
an adverse employment action because he engaged in 
protected First Amendment activity must show that (1) he 
engaged in protected activity, and (2) the protected activity 
was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse 
action. See Swineford v. Snyder County, 15 F.3d 1258, 
1270 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying Mt. Healthy test). If the 
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plaintiff satisfies the first two prongs, the defendant can 
escape liability by showing that (3) he would have taken the 
same action absent the protected activity. See Pro v. 
Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
Fultz argues that the protected activity was the 
successful 1990 Davis suit, and that the adverse action 
was the miscalculation of seniority.1 While the appellants 
acknowledge that Fultz's Davis action was protected First 
Amendment activity, they counter that no reasonable jury 
could have found that Dunn calculated Fultz's seniority to 
retaliate against him for having brought that case, because 
civil service rules governed Dunn's calculation, and because 
Fultz did not bargain for recapture of his seniority in the 
settlement agreement.2 Thus, the appellants contend that 
Fultz did not show that the protected activity was a 
substantial or motivating factor in Dunn's conduct, and 
that in any case, they demonstrated that the seniority 
determination would have been the same absent Fultz's 
protected activity.3 
 
Inasmuch as appellants acknowledge that Fultz's Davis 
suit was protected First Amendment activity, the issue on 
this appeal is whether that activity was a substantial or 
motivating factor in Dunn's calculation of seniority. The 
district court in a post-trial opinion denying appellants a 
judgment as a matter of law determined that "the record 
contains sufficient evidence from which the jury could 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The jury was instructed that the calculation of seniority, and not the 
Department's denying Fultz a promotion, was the adverse action. Fultz 
argued at trial and in his briefs that the loss of promotion stemmed from 
the calculation of seniority, but in view of our result we need not 
describe at length the basis for that argument. 
 
2. It is not clear that Dunn actually made a notation that Fultz did not 
have seniority for his employment prior to his 1988 termination. The 
seniority had been eliminated under the applicable civil service rule 
prior 
to 1992 and it simply was not restored at that time. Nevertheless, we 
sometimes will refer to Dunn as having determined Fultz's seniority. 
 
3. Of course, it is difficult to understand how the third Mt. Healthy v. 
Doyle prong could be implicated in this case, for, if Fultz had not 
engaged in the protected activity by filing the Davis case, there is no 
reason to believe that the Department would have reemployed him and 
thus have had a reason to make decisions affecting his seniority. 
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conclude that the decision as to how to calculate [Fultz'] 
seniority was within . . . Dunn's discretion." We disagree. 
Fultz did not show that Dunn had meaningful discretion to 
act other than he did in determining that Fultz did not 
recapture his seniority upon his reemployment. Moreover, 
Fultz did not bargain for recognition of seniority based on 
his terminated employment in the settlement agreement. 
Rather, he agreed to be reemployed commencing June 15, 
1992. Of course, he had good reason to accept 
reemployment as of that date rather than to insist on being 
reinstated retroactively as of 1988 when he was terminated. 
After all, he acknowledged his error in engaging in the boat 
storage business, but the Department nevertheless agreed 
not to refile the charges against him which our opinion in 
Davis permitted it to do. We also point out that the parties 
cannot repeat the original settlement negotiations, so we 
have no way of knowing whether he could have negotiated 
successfully to recapture his seniority. 
 
Fultz's seniority was governed by 4 Pa. Code S 101.714 
which provides as follows: 
 
        (a) Seniority as used in this part shall be continuous 
       service unless broken by one or more of the following: 
       resignation; retirement; failure to report after 
       notification of appointment through mandatory, 
       preferred or optional reemployment rights; expiration of 
       mandatory, preferred or optional reemployment rights; 
       or failure to report after leave and acceptance of other 
       permanent employment while on leave of absence 
       without pay. If service is broken for one of these 
       reasons, the employe[e] shall lose accrued seniority. If 
       an employe[e] is returned within 1 year after this type 
       of break in service, the employe[e] is entitled to credit 
       for seniority purposes the time accrued up to the time 
       the break in service occurred, but is not entitled to 
       credit for the time represented by the break in service. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The briefs submitted by both sides in this case treated this regulation 
as the one that governed this case. However, near the end of the oral 
argument, counsel for Fultz suggested for the first time that this 
regulation was not in effect at the relevant time. Based on his brief, we 
refuse to entertain that argument. 
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        (b) Periods of furlough and approved leave of absence 
       without pay shall be deemed continuous employment 
       for seniority purposes, except that the period of 
       furlough or leave of absence without pay will not be 
       counted toward seniority. 
 
        (c) Removal for cause shall terminate accrued 
       seniority. Demotion for cause shall terminate seniority 
       in the class from which demoted. 
 
Under this rule, Fultz did not have seniority when the 
Department reemployed him based on his service prior to 
his 1988 removal because his service was not "continuous." 
While the rule provides for recapture of seniority if service 
is broken for one of the enumerated reasons, this recapture 
is possible only if the "employe[e] is returned within 1 year 
after this type of break in service." Here, of course, the 
break in service far exceeded one year. Thus, even if Dunn 
had treated Fultz's termination as a "resignation" or a 
"retirement" Fultz could not have overcome the one-year 
obstacle so as to obtain seniority for his service prior to his 
reemployment. Therefore, we have a situation which, as we 
recently noted in Larsen v. Senate of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, 154 F.3d 82, 95 (3d Cir. 1998), could arise in 
a First Amendment retaliation case: 
 
       In some circumstances, the legitimate basis for the 
       actions might be so apparent that the plaintiff 's 
       allegations of retaliatory motive could not alter the 
       conclusion that under the circumstances . . . the 
       defendants would have been compelled to reach the 
       same decision even without regard for the protected 
       First Amendment activity. 
 
Thus, the protected activity was not a substantial or 
motivating factor in Dunn's conduct with respect to Fultz's 
seniority and the appellants are entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law. 
 
In reaching our result, we reiterate that we recognize that 
when the Department reemployed Fultz, Dunn removed the 
word "terminated" from his personnel record in the 
Department's computer system, as directed by the 
settlement agreement, and entered "voluntary resignation." 
Fultz characterizes the change as "falsely" entered and 
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retaliatory. Dunn's action was literally "false" in that Fultz 
did not voluntarily resign in 1988 but had been terminated 
improperly. Yet the evidence showed that inasmuch as 
Dunn was directed by the settlement agreement to delete 
"terminated," another term had to be entered, and none of 
the available terms characterized what had occurred more 
accurately. 
 
In any event, Fultz could not rebut Dunn's testimony 
that the result -- loss of seniority -- would have been the 
same regardless of what term he used. Dunn testified that 
he selected the term "voluntary resignation" from a set of 
terms or "transaction codes" used at that time by the 
Department to describe various changes in employment 
status, such as transfers or leaves. While he had discretion 
in labeling the four-year break in service as a "voluntary 
resignation," versus such other plausible, available terms 
as "involuntary resignation" or even "retirement," he 
testified that his choice of label was in any case immaterial 
because, whatever the label -- "voluntary resignation" or 
"involuntary resignation" or "wrongly terminated and now 
reinstated" -- under the civil service rules Fultz would have 
lost his seniority. 
 
As we have indicated, our reading of the civil service 
rules convinces us that Dunn was correct. The applicable 
civil service rule states that seniority is lost whenever there 
is a break in an employee's service of more than one year, 
4 Pa. Code S 101.71 (a), whether the break is due to 
"retirement," "termination" or "resignation," and other 
circumstances. Id. The only express exceptions are for 
employees who are furloughed or on "leave without pay," 
terms which certainly did not describe the circumstances 
here. Id., at (a), (b).5 Thus, in his brief Fultz completely 
misstates what happened when the Department reemployed 
him in 1992, as he indicates that "Mr. Dunn wiped out over 
24-years of service, by falsely entering Mr. Fultz's 1988 
termination as a `voluntary resignation.' " Br. at 11. In fact, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
  
5. Dunn testified that he did not use the term "leave without pay" to 
characterize the four-year break because he understood that Fultz had 
withdrawn funds from the state retirement fund between 1988 and 1992 
and could not or did not wish to repay them. 
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it was the circumstance that Fultz's service was not 
continuous as required by the applicable civil service rule 
which "wiped out" his seniority. 
 
We find it highly significant that if Dunn had 
circumvented the Department's transaction codes and more 
accurately indicated that Fultz had been "wrongfully 
terminated and was now reemployed" Fultz nevertheless 
would not have recaptured the pre-1988 service for 
seniority purposes, because his service would not have 
been continuous and the break in service still would not 
have been attributable to a circumstance under the civil 
service rules allowing seniority recapture. It is thus clear 
that Fultz reasonably cannot charge that Dunn wrongfully 
deprived him of seniority. 
 
Moreover, if Dunn attempted to invent a term to 
recapture Fultz's seniority for his service prior to the 1988 
termination, he would have been giving Fultz more than he 
bargained for when he came to an agreement with the 
Department settling the Davis action. The settlement 
agreement did not mention seniority, so when Fultz was 
returned to work, Dunn had no directive to give Fultz more 
than he had bargained for or to which he was entitled as, 
in effect, a new employee.6 The plain fact is that Fultz is 
misusing this First Amendment retaliation case as a vehicle 
to enhance his settlement. 
 
The only evidence Fultz presented to show that Dunn 
retaliated against him by "incorrectly" reinstating him 
without accrued seniority was his own belief that under the 
settlement agreement he would be reinstated with accrued 
seniority, and his conversation with John Wilk, Executive 
Director of the Civil Service Commission, when he did not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The district court's order of September 24, 1996, to remedy Fultz's 
failure to receive a promotion directed the appellants to enter into 
Fultz's 
personnel record the term, "[w]rongful termination and reemployment 
with no break in service," a term that did not exist as a transaction code 
option at the time Dunn made the entry (and does not exist today) and 
which would have had to have been invented by him for the express 
purpose of preserving seniority. This order was an unjustified 
amendment of the settlement agreement to give Fultz seniority to which 
he was not entitled. 
 
                                11 
  
receive a promotion. Fultz asserts that Wilk had told him 
that "the department had the right to interpret[the 
seniority rule] however they wanted." But that vague 
evidence cannot be permitted to overcome the 
unambiguous rule provisions so as to permit a conclusion 
that Dunn could have circumvented the rule. The rule is 
clear and leaves no room for "interpretation." Moreover, 
there was no evidence to show that Fultz had been 
promised the opportunity to return to work with his 
seniority preserved. Finally, we point out that inasmuch as 
Fultz apparently recognized that there was a seniority 
question when the 1990 case was settled, he should have 
clarified that point at that time. If he had done so, this case 
could have been avoided. 
 
In sum, it is perfectly clear that Fultz has not shown that 
Dunn would have -- or could have -- done other than view 
the four-year interruption as a break in service leading to 
the elimination of accrued seniority, given that Fultz did 
not bargain for anything else. We find that Fultz failed to 
provide sufficient evidence to show that his protected 
activity was a substantial or motivating factor for the 
seniority decision. Thus, Fultz's evidence as to retaliatory 
conduct was insufficient to support the verdict and the 
appellants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, in the appellants' appeal, No. 
97-7378, we will reverse the judgment and orders in favor 
of Fultz granting him damages and equitable relief, and will 
remand the case to the district court to enter a judgment as 
a matter of law in favor of appellants Dunn and Farley. We 
will dismiss Fultz's appeal in No. 97-7503 as moot. 
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